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The Speech Act of Naming in Context:  
A Linguistic Study of Naming in the Old 
Testament 
Lauren Yost 
English, Literature, and Modern Languages 
Introduction 
aming is a reoccurring and significant theme throughout Scripture, particularly in 
the Old Testament. Because of this, scholars should discuss and study it more in 
depth. The philosophical linguistic speech act theory provides one framework for 
analyzing naming. Ultimately, naming as presented in the Old Testament is in fact a speech 
act that is subject to specific rules and carries great importance. I will begin by providing an 
overview of speech acts and the study of them as applied to Scripture, as well as names and 
their historical and cultural significance. After this, I will display the framework of my 
study and then present my findings, followed by a brief discussion. 
Literature Review 
Scholars have not studied the speech act of naming much, let alone within biblical texts. 
And while speech acts have been studied within Scripture to some degree, it is more often 
applied as a hermeneutic approach, Scripture as being a speech act in and of itself. Because 
of this, my overview will begin by providing a basic framework of primarily speech act 
theory and secondly names as reference, which will serve as a foundation for the rest of my 
study. Next, I will provide a few examples of this kind of study as well as a brief look at 
God’s own ability to perform speech acts. Lastly, as biblical texts are deeply rooted in 
history and culture, I will address in this overview various historical and cultural factors 
that play into the act of naming. 
Speech Acts and Names (Semantics and Pragmatics) 
It is not possible within the scope of this study to provide a full coverage and analysis of all 
that has been said on the topic of speech acts. For my present purpose, then, I will provide a 
basic overview, which comes mainly from Cruse’s Meaning in Language (2011), a great 
overview with multiple sources and theories. Two other helpful works I chose to include as 
supplements are Alston’s Illocutionary Acts & Sentence Meaning (2000) and Korta & Perry’s 
Critical Pragmatics (2011). I will start by addressing the main focus of my study, speech 
acts, looking also to the idea of reference under which names typically fall. 
N 
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Speech Acts 
The main premise of any theory of speech acts is that humans are able to use words in 
ways that go beyond their simple linguistic content. This is an idea mainly originating with 
Austin (1975) and continually developed by Searle (1999) and others, more recently by 
Alston (2000). Speech acts, as pointed out by Cruse (2011), dwell in both semantic and 
pragmatic study, though he groups them with other pragmatic topics as is conventional. 
While Korta and Perry’s brief address of speech acts is from a more pragmatic angle 
(2011), Alston takes them in a more semantic direction by looking ultimately at meaning.  
The term speech act is used mostly as a topical term covering three specific kinds of acts: 
locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts (Cruse, 2011). At the base, a 
locutionary act is simply an utterance. Cruse includes that it has a “certain sense and 
certain reference” (p. 363). Alston (2000) calls this level a sentential act, focusing mainly on 
the utterance itself. A perlocutionary act looks to the result of an utterance, either the 
completed performance of an act (Cruse) or the effect on an audience (Alston). Occurring 
somewhere in between, an illocutionary act is much more difficult to clearly define, though 
people often include the idea of the speaker’s intention. Cruse and Alston both 
acknowledge that an illocutionary act is an utterance containing a particular action. Alston, 
however, spends a solid portion of his book laying out exactly how that works, which I will 
touch on later. In demonstrating the connection between the three kinds of acts, 
Wolterstorff (1995) writes, “Illocutionary acts are related to locutionary acts by way of the 
counting as relation; perlocutionary acts are related to illocutionary acts by causality” (p. 
33). Although Alston uses different language and recognizes periodic exceptions, he would 
likely agree. 
In a discussion of speech acts, one is likely to hear the term “performative verb.” These 
kinds of verbs “function specifically to encode illocutionary force” (Cruse, 2011, p. 365), 
with illocutionary force being the “act aimed at by producing an utterance” (p. 365). While 
these explicit verbs are useful for identifying speech acts, they are not needed for a 
successful act and are actually quite limited in their usability. This connects also to the 
performative hypothesis, which asserts, “There are certain types of utterance whose 
properties seem to suggest that even implicit performatives have a ‘hidden’ or underlying 
explicit performative verb” (Cruse, 2011, p. 373). In other words, one could reimagine the 
sentence with the same general content and force with an added explicit performative verb. 
Cruse gives the following formula with everything in italics as optional: I (hereby) Vp you 
(that) S. Though this hypothesis may not be as accepted as others, Alston (2000) appears to 
agree at least with the basic idea. 
Generally, illocutionary acts are divided further into five categories, though terminology 
occasionally differs. Here, they are listed with examples from Cruse (2011) and Arcadi 
(2013): 
1. assertives: stating, asserting, reporting, acknowledging  
2. directives: ordering, requesting, suggesting, commanding 
3. commissives: promising, betting, threatening, vowing 
4. expressives: thanking, forgiving, congratulating, praising 
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5. declaratives/exercitives: appointing, naming, consecrating, sentencing (in a 
court) 
The final category is called “declaratives” by Cruse (2011) and “exercitives” by Alston 
(2000). As a note, from here on I will use the term declarative as it is used more frequently 
and is more quickly understood. The act of naming, as shown above, is a declarative. Cruse 
points out that these are “said to bring about a change in reality” (p. 375), highlighted by 
the examples. Naming in Scripture, however, is often initiated by a command or a directive. 
This particular category of illocutionary acts Cruse defines as having “the intention of 
eliciting some sort of action on the part of the hearer” (p. 374). My study will mainly focus 
on the declarative act of naming but may include some aspects of directives as necessary. 
So how does an illocutionary act work? Simply stating the proper arrangement of words 
does not constitute an illocutionary act.  Wolterstorff (1995) touches on this matter when 
he writes, “To institute an arrangement for the performance of speech actions is to institute 
a way of acquiring rights and responsibilities” (p. 84), which he considers to be moral ones. 
Korta and Perry (2011) instead emphasize the speaker’s plan or intentions as central to an 
act but mention the need for conditions. Alston (2000) recognizes the existence of 
intentions. But more similarly to Wolterstorff, he sees the particular conditions for which 
the speaker takes responsibility as being integral to an illocutionary act. Alston calls these 
conditions illocutionary rules, or I-rules, and spends a large portion of his book 
demonstrating and proving how they work using a particular model. As I will be using his 
model within my own study of naming, I will present the basic framework for a declarative 
here (Alston): (U stands for the utterer or speaker, S stands for the sentence, and R stands 
for taking responsibility.) 
EXER. U O’d in uttering S (where ‘O’ is a term for purporting to be producing a 
particular conventional effect, E) = df. In uttering S, U R’d that: 
1. Conceptually necessary conditions for E. 
2. U has the authority to produce E.  
3. Conditions are appropriate for the exercise of that authority. 
4. By uttering S, U is bringing about E. (2000, p. 93) 
To put this more clearly, a speaker intends to produce a conventional effect (a speech act) 
in uttering a sentence, when in uttering that sentence the speaker takes responsibility for 
certain things being true. This includes the conceptually necessary conditions for the effect 
being met, the speaker having the authority to produce the effect, the conditions being 
appropriate for the exercise of that authority, and that by uttering the sentence, the 
speaker brings about the effect (Alston, 2000). 
Further conditions contained in these I-rules can be categorized as follows:  
• preparatory conditions: the necessary context 
• sincerity conditions: dealing with the appropriate beliefs or feelings of the 
speaker 
• essential conditions: define the act and address the idea of speaker’s 
intentions  
• uptake: dealing with the hearer’s reception (Cruse, 2011).  
These rules and conditions are the infrastructure that allow illocutionary acts to work. 
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In my research, Ward (2002) presents Wolterstorff (1995) as disagreeing with the 
existence of the five categories of illocutionary acts. This was not evident in Wolterstorff’s 
writing, at least when he addresses and defines speech. However, in revealing rather than 
speaking, he believes that not all the same actions can be performed. Perhaps one might 
think he is in disagreement as Wolterstorff does not see rules as constituting speech acts. 
However, Wolterstorff also recognizes the existence of contextual conditions necessary for 
the categorizations. Even in the case that he does disagree, the category framework seems 
to be the more legitimate and widely held theoretical framework, which I will use in my 
study. 
Names  
As mentioned earlier, the concept of names is typically addressed in a study of reference 
having to do “with designating entities in the world by linguistic means” (Cruse, 2011, p. 
381). As names designate people, they are most appropriately addressed here. Cruse, like 
Searle (1999), would further say reference is a speech act itself, but I will not expand on 
that idea.  
The topic of reference in dealing with the nature of reality is one of controversy, and the 
subject of names within the topic does not escape controversy either. Most often, there are 
two main views of names. The first is that they are ultimately meaningless, nothing more 
than an assigned label. However, we clearly associate particular qualities with names in 
order to identify and conceptualize (Cruse, 2011). The other view of names is that they 
“function as abbreviated descriptions” (Cruse, 2011, p. 394), with meaning coming through 
association. However, one might object that a person’s name does not change when the 
understanding of that same person does (Cruse, 2011). Schneider (2009) also addresses 
two similar views of names, though from a more philosophical and somewhat sociological 
perspective. Here, names are either viewed as carriers of identity or arbitrary labels. I will 
explain this more later. Bardis (1972), citing Hertzler, views names more in light of their 
various functions, writing: 
First, they identify, signify, or denote something; second, they assign the named 
entity to a meaningful classification; third, they become part of a person in all 
cultures; and fourth, they facilitate the named entity’s manipulation, since the 
entity is no longer secret or fugitive. (p. 101) 
While it is easy to identify that important role names serve in communication, they are 
much more difficult to analyze and classify. 
Names are then, as Korta and Perry (2011) coined, “nambiguous.” Cruse (2011) points out 
that in order for a name to be used, it “must be associated with a set of properties” (p. 396), 
but at the same time they are “liable to modification at any time” (p. 396). Additionally, a 
particular name does not refer to the same individual in each instance that it is used (Korta 
& Perry, 2011). Even so, we do not seem to have difficulty with this reality as we might 
with other words. Korta and Perry put forth a possible solution to this puzzling 
phenomenon with what they call a name-notion network. A network is formed when 
multiple people co-refer to the same individual at different instances with a particular 
name. Other people later conditionally co-refer (or coco-refer) to that individual in 
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referring to a co-reference. This may happen explicitly, as in naming a child, or implicitly, 
and it allows for both an individual to be referred to with multiple names as well as one 
name to refer to any number of individuals. Additionally, though names are attached to 
people and not roles, the way names are used in utterances is related to roles as names link 
the roles contained in utterances (Korta & Perry, 2011). 
Speech Acts in Scripture 
The majority of study relating speech act theory and Scripture consists of analyzing and/or 
justifying the application of speech act theory as a hermeneutical approach. However 
interesting, this is not the focus of my research. Instead, I seek to study speech acts as 
recorded in Scripture. Though scholars don’t give as much attention to this, there is still a 
precedent for identifying and analyzing speech acts found in biblical texts. A few 
noteworthy studies include Mann’s (2013) book and his later (2017) article as well as 
Arcadi’s (2013) article, whose study I use as a model for some of my own. 
Also important to note is that there are various instances recorded of God performing 
speech acts, either himself or through another means. While a number of philosophers and 
theologians have given the matter thought, Wolterstorff (1995) presents a more 
comprehensive analysis. He recognizes that speech acts cannot be performed through 
revealing but makes the case that God speaks and therefore can perform speech acts. He 
distinguishes between speaking and revealing. Wolterstorff claims that a person cannot 
perform acts through revealing, but only through speech. On the other side, “asserting, 
commanding, promising, and asking do not consist in the transmission of knowledge” (p. 
33), but revealing does, wich distinguishes it from speaking. He also presents the idea of 
double agency to help the reader understand just how God might speak, rather than reveal, 
if he does not have the vocal mechanisms or writing capabilities to produce an utterance. 
Some helpful imagery here is the idea of a deputy or a secretary. As speech acts require 
some form of obligation, the question is raised whether God can be obligated. However, 
Wolterstorff finds “no reason to conclude that God cannot have the rights and duties… 
necessary for participating fully in the community of discoursers” (p. 112). 
Historical and Cultural Factors 
Many authors quickly point out the differences in the significance of names and naming 
across cultures. Wilson (2017) and Bardis (1972) acknowledge the casual stance taken by 
the modern Western world, contrasted with other ancient and modern cultures who put 
more weight on names. In his article, Schneider (2009) takes a philosophical look into 
these differences by dividing them into two main positions: the anthroponomastic realist 
and the nominalist. He writes that “names are viewed… in mutually contradictory ways: a 
name can either carry… the freight of one’s unique identity, or it can be seen as contingent, 
accidental, fundamentally meaningless” (para. 2). The first position is that of the 
anthroponomastic realist, which would include Judeo-Christian peoples, who believe that 
names are significant and “arise from and reflect essential being” (Schneider, 2009, para. 
10). The second position is that of the nominalist where one believes that “names are 
nothing more than arbitrary labels” (Schneider, 2009, para. 9), which leades to ultimate 
self-determination (Schneider, 2009). 
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While the accuracy of the two positions is debatable, it is clear that “the ancient Hebrew 
considered his name exceedingly important” (Bardis, 1972, p. 101). Davids (n.d., para. 10; 
citing Speiser 1964) writes, “Names were regarded not only as labels but also as symbols, 
magical keys, as it were, to the nature and essence of the given being or thing,” and Bardis 
writes, “Even mere knowledge of a man’s name includes a strange power over its bearer” 
(1972, p. 102).  
The Hebrew Perspective  
It is widely accepted that naming occurs most often as an act of a mother in the biblical 
Hebrew context (Davids, n.d.; Teubal, 1995; Bridge, 2014; Bardis, 1972). Teubal suggests 
that this is because “in biblical times… children were named the moment they were born – 
by mothers and midwives who chose names appropriate to the conditions, or their 
perceptions, of appearance as they are born” (1995, para. 17). Bridge (2014) notes that this 
connection may be due to the narrative style, but support seems to be evident, nonetheless. 
Bardis (1972) affirms that the act was one held most often by parents as those superior to 
the one being named. An exception might be names given later in life at significant 
moments of change. This practice is suggested primarily by Wilson (2017) and Bardis. 
Teubal (1995) suggests, “Naming implies creation, the act of bringing into existence” (para. 
18). Bardis (1972) similarly points out that “a name did not only distinguish its bearer, but 
it also indicated his essence, thus creating a name-existence identity. In other words, 
namelessness implied nonexistence” (Bardis, 1972, p. 102). The act of naming, then, is very 
significant, and both Davids (n.d.) and Teubal connect it to God’s own divine creative 
nature using naming as a way of bringing order (Davids, n.d.). Davids further states, “God 
gave human beings the ability and power to name” (n.d., para. 18). It is, in fact, a power as 
“the act of naming… places the name-giver in authority over the name-bearer” (Teubal, 
1995, para. 3). As an interesting side note, Teubal and Bardis use this all as evidence 
pointing to the authority and power held by women in this patriarchal society. 
Scripture also points to the significance of names in Hebrew culture. Often, a name was 
given in connection with prophecy either by a mother (Davids, n.d.), a prophet with his 
own children (Bardis, 1972), or a “divine announcements to a barren woman conceiving” 
(Bridge, 2014, p. 396-397). Symbolism was also sometimes involved in these names 
(Bardis, 1972). At times, God himself named a person. Bardis (1972) points out that he 
carefully named those he chose, and when he changed a person’s name, “the 
metamorphosis was cataclysmic” (p. 108), whether positively or negatively. Schneider 
(2009), however, in quoting the author of the article Science and Faith, argues that God 
reveals in his own name for himself “the irrelevance of all divine names” (para. 12). As this 
is not the majority opinion, I will work from the assumption that names were meaningful 
and important in Hebrew culture. 
Based on this literature, I still assert that naming presented in the Old Testament is a 
speech act that is subject to specific rules and carries great importance. Now, I will add my 
own contribution to this discussion. 
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Methods 
Instrument Design 
Before I could analyze the act of naming in the Old Testament, I first needed to design the 
schema that I would test. This consisted of an in-depth study of the Hebrew words used in 
the phenomenon of naming in the original text, which I then used to create an extended 
definition, identify variables, and formulate a schema to test. 
Defining Naming  
To conduct my word studies, I used Accordance software to search for all occurrences of 
the English word name in the Old Testament, particularly for its use in the act of naming 
and utilizing a parallel Hebrew text to find the original word. Similarly, I searched the 
English word call and determined to focus my study on the Hebrew equivalent qārāʾ. 
Having decided to study the word qārāʾ, I utilized Hebrew concordances, lexicons, and 
theological dictionaries (see References page) to more fully understand the usage of the 
word in its original language, specifically the meaning “to name.” 
The Hebrew word qārāʾ occurs 700-9001 times in the Old Testament. It occurs in the Qal 
stem 661 times, at least twice as often in Genesis than nearly any other book of the Old 
Testament. The next highest stem use is 62 occurrences in the Niphal stem, mostly in the 
prophets (Labuschagne, 1997). The Qal stem conveys a simple action in the active voice 
while the Niphal stem conveys a simple action in the passive voice (Van Pelt). 
Ultimately, qārāʾ is a word of communication that “often precedes a verb of speech” 
(Labuschagne, 1997, p. 1160). It involves sounds produced by the voice (Coppes, 1980; 
Labuschagne, 1997) “to draw attention to oneself… in order to establish contact with 
someone else” (Jonker, 1997, p. 971). Coppes’ definition brings in the additional idea of a 
carried message (1980). The word qārāʾ is “only rarely used of animals… and almost never 
in a figurative sense” (Labuschagne, 1997, p. 1159). Additionally, the word is similar to the 
same verb in other Semitic languages (Jonker, 1997). 
While qārāʾ is such a basic, foundational word, it has a wide range of meanings in its 
various usages. The following list demonstrates many of the possible translations, as 
consolidated from translations given by Brown, Driver, Briggs, Gesenius, & Robinson 
(1979), Wigram (1984), and Köhler et al. (2001):
announce 
appoint 
call 
call on 
                                                             
1 I found conflicting numbers here, hence the range. This is perhaps due to different original manuscripts 
chosen and counted. 
call together 
create 
crow  
cry 
declaim 
invite 
invoke 
mention 
name 
preach 
proclaim  
pronounce 
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publish 
read 
say 
shout 
spout 
summon 
With the multitude of occurrences and meanings, it is impossible to fully cover them all 
within this one study. From here, I present only the usage meaning “to name,” which is the 
technical term used for naming throughout the Old Testament (Schauerte, Hossfeld, 
Lamberty-Zielinski, Dahmen, & Kindl, 2004; Labuschagne, 1997). Most often, this particular 
meaning is constructed in one of the following ways: qrʾ šēm + acc. of the name; qrʾ šēm 
le/ʾel; qrʾ le/ʾel; or qrʾ bešēm (Labuschagne, 1997; Jonker, 1997; Schauerte, et al., 2004). 
Additionally, these are all used in the Qal stem when presenting a specific act of naming. 
This occurs most frequently in the earlier books of the Old Testament. However, the Niphal 
stem is also sometimes used to demonstrate a name as a durative characteristic (Schauerte, 
et al., 2004).  
Looking to the more cultural, contextual usage, qārāʾ when meaning “to name” frequently 
involves a “demonstration of authority” (Jonker, 1997, p. 972) or “assertion of sovereignty” 
(Coppes, 1980, p. 810) over the name-receiver. A mother is the one frequently showing this 
authority, often naming immediately after birth. Examples contrary to this would be due to 
literary narrative purposes or the foreign status of a mother (Schauerte, Hossfeld, 
Lamberty-Zielinski, Dahmen, & Kindl, 2004). 
Jonker (1997), in quoting Ramsey’s 1988 study of name-giving constructions with qrʾ, 
states, “The OT narratives report that circumstances frequently influence the way people 
name individuals and places, but it is very difficult to identify a passage where the narrator 
suggests that the name given is intended to shape the character of the recipient (34)” (p. 
973). In other words, Hebrews did not see naming as forming the identity of the receiver, 
but rather was shaped by the surrounding circumstances and events. Coppes (1980) points 
out that a name may in fact “[indicate] a primary characteristic of the thing named” (p. 
810), but this is a description rather than a determiner. While Schauerte, Hossfeld, 
Lamberty-Zielinski, Dahmen, & Kindl (2004) presents Fichtner’s theory that “a name serves 
to define the nature of the entity named” (p. 127), Schauerte, et al. seem to take a more 
moderate stance saying, “a name does far more than simply label and distinguish different 
entities” (2004, p. 127), highlighting the significance if not the power. Other formations of 
names include a play on words, a confession, a personal evaluation, or even a recognition of 
an eternal truth (Coppes, 1980). 
Schauerte, Hossfeld, Lamberty-Zielinski, Dahmen, & Kindl (2004) also discuss the 
occurrence of renaming. Using the same word qārāʾ,  we see theologically significant, 
central figures renamed. Most often, it is God who initiates this change. Other renamings, 
however, occur for symbolic purposes or cultural reasons (Schauerte, et al., 2004). 
To further understand qārāʾ, I also looked at šēm, the Hebrew word for “name”. They occur 
together 86 times in the Old Testament and together convey the act of naming. As written 
by Kaiser (1980), W. R. Smith thinks šēm is perhaps derived from an Arabic root meaning 
“to mark or brand,” ultimately a way of distinguishing one person from another. Bietenhard 
echoes this as restated by Ross (1997). While this is the base understanding, Ross also 
points out that culturally, a name was not only simply a means of identification, but “was 
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considered to be a description of character or conditions” (1997, p. 147). Ross later 
cautions against the tendency to equate a name describing personality to a person’s very 
soul and suggests that narrators analyzed names “in such a way as to unlock the meaning of 
the event” (1997, p. 149) rather than the meanings we read being inherent to the names. 
Kaiser (1980), Ross (1997), and Reiterer, Ringgren, & Fabry (2006) all highlight the 
connection of a name to reputation, identity, and existence. Names could then represent a 
person and his existence (Ross, 1997) and Kaiser goes so far as to write “‘to cut off the 
name’ was equal to liquidating the person himself” (1980, p. 934). 
From these studies, my extended definition of naming conveyed by qārāʾ with šēm is the act 
of giving a name within specific circumstances by one with authority over the name-
receiver, whose authority is respected by others such that the name spoken identifies and 
represents the receiver. 
First Draft of Schema  
From my extended definition, study of Alston (2000), and example of Arcadi (2013), the 
following variables were found in the act of naming: 
U – a name-giver 
O – intends to name  
X – name-receiver 
C – community  
E – naming
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While not always recorded in Scripture, the following is also implied and necessary: 
S – a naming sentence 
I then drafted the following schema of illocutionary rules for the act of naming: 
A speaker intends to name while uttering a naming sentence. If the speaker takes 
responsibility for the conceptually necessary conditions, and if they are in place for 
naming, the speaker has the authority within the community to name. However, the 
conditions must be appropriate for the exercise of that authority, and by uttering 
the naming sentence, the speaker can name the name-receiver. 
In Alston’s (2000) format, this is written as follows: 
U O’d in uttering S iff in uttering S, U R’d that: 
1. Conceptually necessary conditions for E.  
2. U has the authority within C to produce E.  
3. Conditions are appropriate for the exercise of that authority. 
4. By uttering S, U is bringing about E of X.  
I will now expand each rule of the schema to further clarify and lay out the conditions 
within the I-rules. 
 1. Conceptually necessary conditions for E.  
As explained by Arcadi (2013), these are conditions necessary within the act itself. For 
example, X needs to be identifiable by means of a name. If this were not necessary, naming 
would not be needed. Related, if X is to be distinguished from others, X must be a singular 
entity. 
 2. U has the authority within C to produce E.  
C must recognize and ascribe authority to U or E will not hold. C would simply disregard 
the attempt. This authority comes from social conventions most often, but at times it is 
divine authorization. 
 3. Conditions are appropriate for the exercise of that authority.  
Arcadi (2013) explains these as the conditions external to the act, or in other words the 
contextual circumstances. Here, I say someone must hear U O, otherwise the name will not 
be put into use. Additionally, the circumstances should expose the need for E. Most 
frequently this is because a new baby has entered the world, however, in cases of 
renaming, it might be due to a new position whether in role or identity. 
4. By uttering S, U is bringing about E of X.  
Based on the above conditions, U now expects the name to hold. Because of the authority of 
U within C, this is perhaps socially enforced.  
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Case Studies 
After I designed the schema through extended word study, definition, and analysis, I began 
testing. I chose nine instances of naming in the Old Testament that included the presence of 
both qārāʾ and šēm to serve as case studies in which I could test my schema. I looked for 
instances of each of the following categories: naming instituted by a human (Genesis 29:32-
30:24; Exodus 2:22; 1 Samuel 1:20), naming instituted by God (Genesis 17:19; 2 Samuel 
12:25, Hosea 1:4, 6, and 9), renaming instituted by a human (Genesis 41:45; Numbers 
13:162), and renaming instituted by God (Genesis 32:28, 35:10). While many acts of naming 
occur in the book of Genesis, I intentionally chose an example for each category from other 
books of the Old Testament when possible to offer a fuller representation. Commentaries 
looking at the act of naming involved in each passage helped me test my schema in each 
context for its variables and conditions. 
Results 
I tested the schema in nine different passages which served as case studies. Genesis 29:32-
30:24 records a series of acts of naming the children of Jacob. While I looked at each 
instance individually, this passage served as one case study. In Exodus 2:22, Moses names 
his first son, and 1 Samuel 1:20 records Hannah naming Samuel, for whom she prayed. 
These three passages serve as examples of naming instituted by a human. Genesis 17:19 
records God’s promise of a son to Abraham and Sarah, who was to be named Isaac. 2 
Samuel 12:25 provides an interesting account of God giving a second name to David’s son, 
Solomon, through his prophet, Nathan. In Hosea 1:4, 6, and 9, God commands Hosea to give 
names to each of his three children. These three passages serve as examples of naming 
instituted by God. Genesis 41:45 records Pharaoh giving Joseph a new name and in 
Numbers 13:16, Moses renames Joshua. These both serve as examples of renaming 
instituted by a human. Finally, Genesis 32:28 and 35:10 record the renaming of Jacob as 
instituted by God. While this is not the only occurrence of God renaming, I chose to focus on 
just one as the others occur in Genesis as well.  
In testing the variables in these passages, I found the recorded presence of a name-giver 
(U) and a community (C) in all nine. A name-receiver (X) and the actual effect of naming (E) 
were present in all but Genesis 17:19, where X was promised to come and therefore the act 
could not be fully completed. Interestingly, a naming sentence (S) is only recorded when 
God is the U. However, as all examples demonstrate the eventual and successful act of 
naming, S is implied. If S were not present, E would not have occurred. Related, the 
intention of naming (O) is only explicit in Hosea 1 and Genesis 32 and 35. This is deeply 
connected to the presence of S, so it is similarly implied in the other passages. In the 
remaining case of Genesis 17:19, the intent is present but is for the future, which makes it 
not as explicit as the other two. This information can be found in Table 1 in the appendices. 
                                                             
2 Numbers 13:16 does not in fact use the word šēm like the other eight passages, but the act was clear enough 
and interesting enough that I still included it. 
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Following this, I tested the various I-rules and subsequent conditions in the nine case 
studies. Here, I found that both of the conceptually necessary conditions were met in all 
nine passages. Additionally, U always had the authority within C to name, and successful 
naming occurred each time. However, as S was only recorded in three instances (see 
above), it could only be recorded as heard in those instances. As S was implied in the other 
instances though, I would again conclude that S was heard based on the success of the act. 
In all but two instances (2 Samuel 12:25 and Numbers 13:16), the circumstances exposed 
the need for E. While some commentaries offer potential explanations for this instance of 
naming by God and renaming by Moses, I did not see them directly in Scripture and 
therefore cannot confirm their presence. Nevertheless, based on the importance placed on 
names in the culture, the act would not have occurred without reason. This information can 
be found in Table 2 in the appendices. 
Discussion 
Based on my case studies, I stand by my initial schema of illocutionary rules, restated 
below. The conditions within the I-rules are included for easier reading. 
U O’d in uttering S iff in uttering S, U R’d that: 
1. Conceptually necessary conditions for E.  
- X needs to be identifiable by means of a name 
- X must be a singular entity 
2. U has the authority within C to produce E.  
3. Conditions are appropriate for the exercise of that authority. 
- Someone must hear U O 
- The circumstances expose the need for E 
4. By uttering S, U is bringing about E of X. 
The research I present here fits well within the current conversation as laid out in my 
literature review. Admittedly, I started from Alston’s framework (2000), but my own 
analysis proved to have result in the same understanding. One difference I noticed and 
think to be important is the presence of the community. While Arcadi (2013) mentions this 
as the source of authority, the act of naming that intends the henceforth use of the name 
requires a community to a greater degree. This fits with Korta and Perry’s (2011) theory of 
coco-referring. The community, then, is necessary for both the authority to name and the 
association of a name with a person.  
Additionally, in working with narrative, not every detail was recorded. However, I found it 
interesting to see that God’s speech was considered important enough to record, even in an 
act more regularly performed by humans. Walton (2001) similarly acknowledges God’s act 
of naming has greater power, even to determine the future. Perhaps this, along with the 
fact that he is God and not a man, accounts for the recorded presence of a naming sentence. 
While I did not focus on name meanings and reasons in my research, I still noticed some 
common threads. As mentioned in my literature review, some believe that names carry 
identity. However, I saw that while they do often offer at least a description of the receiver, 
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naming more often shows the faith of the parents or their perspectives of the 
circumstances (Reiterer, Ringgren, & Fabry, 2006; Enns, 2000; Arnold, 2003; Walton, 
2001). This second part was supported by my initial research. Additionally, I have to 
acknowledge the meanings or reasons sometimes given at the time of naming. While Ross 
(1997) suggests the narrator added this later, Walton (2001) and Arnold (2003) posit 
instead that these are examples of word play of similar sounds connecting a name and its 
given explanation. In light of all this, it is clear names were not regarded as arbitrary labels 
but rather carried with them significance and a story. This was no casual act. 
All of this is fairly broad and may not appear to have any immediate application. However, 
this study not only confirms what appears to be true culturally, it helps us to better 
understand ourselves, our God, and the power of our words. As little that has been studied 
in this topic, I would encourage continued research on the act of naming and its 
significance, while also expanding to other speech acts recorded in Scripture. Still, some 
potential avenues of future study appeared as I studied. To begin, I personally would have 
enjoyed looking more into the effects or the perlocutionary act of naming. Naming also 
sometimes occurred as the result of a command (another kind of speech act) so it would be 
interesting to look specifically at those instances. Though I studied examples from God and 
humans together, the power in naming is clearly different between the two entities, and so 
I would enjoy comparing the two. Additionally, the current study could be extended to the 
New Testament, or even the Catholic tradition of giving a Christian name to a child as 
connected to patterns set in Scripture. It also might be interesting to compare naming in 
this particular context with naming in the modern, Western world or perhaps another 
culture at another point in history. 
Limitations 
In a study of speech acts, narrative provides a unique challenge in analysis. I could only 
study and analyze what the authors included in their writing, so some of my conclusion is 
founded on assumptions of implied presence. Examples of unsuccessful attempts at naming 
would have also been beneficial. Unfortunately, I am not well versed in the Hebrew 
language. Though I did consult references to assist me, my study was limited by my 
inability to study the original text as it was intended. Additionally, I only tested my schema 
in nine different passages. While this covered about 10% of the uses of qārāʾ with šēm, 
further testing could reveal flaws or additions to my schema. 
Recognitions 
I would like to thank Dr. Ched Spellman and Dr. Joshua Kira for giving me their time to 
assist me in connecting speech act theory with theology. I would also like to thank Dr. Joel 
Williams for his help in understanding the basics of Hebrew grammar and for providing 
direction in my word studies. Of course, none of this would be possible without the 
continuous guidance and encouragement of my capstone professor, Mrs. Louise 
Grandouiller. To these individuals and more, I am indebted. 
Page 30                                                                                                            Yost • Speech Act of Naming 
 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly, the naming that occurs in the Old Testament is a significant act. In using speech act 
theory and Alston’s framework of illocutionary rules (2000) as a tool for analysis, I have 
shown that Old Testament naming is subject to certain rules with necessary circumstances, 
conditions, and authority occurring within a community. Because this is a complex, 
important act that appears throughout all of Scripture, Christians and scholars should bring 
the act of naming to theological conversations more regularly and continue to study for a 
more thorough understanding.  
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Appendices 
 
Table 1. The presence of variables in nine case study passages, with x denoting the 
recorded presence, \ denoting the implied presence, and > denoting a future fulfillment. 
 
 
Table 2. The satisfaction of illocutionary rules in nine case study passages, with x denoting 
the recorded presence and \ denoting the implied presence. 
 
 
